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Casenote
NEGLIGENCE-DEFENSE OF UNAVOIDABLE ACCIDENT
Moats v. Lienemann, 188 Neb. 452, 197 N.W.2d 372 (1972).
In Moats v. Lienemann' the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed
a district court jury's determination that the automobile collision
out of which the plaintiff's negligence action arose was not an
"unavoidable accident".2 An unavoidable accident "has been de-
fined as an inevitable accident, an event or an occurrence which
could not have been prevented by any human foresight or ordinary
prudence, the result occurring without fault.' 3
The case arose after the defendant's decedent, Lienemann, suf-
fered a massive cerebral hemorrhage while driving his car.4 The
car then left the highway and continued on the shoulder of the
1. 188 Neb. 452, 197 N.W.2d 372 (1972).
2. Brief for Appellant at 3, Moats v. Lienemann, 188 Neb. 452, 197
N.W.2d 372 (1972). In answer to plaintiff's complaint, the defendant
alleged that the collision was the result of an unavoidable accident
caused by the defendant's decedent having suffered a sudden illness
which he had no reason to expect and which rendered it impossible
for him to control his automobile.
3. Kirchner, Sudden Illness as a Defense in Auto Accidents, 16 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REv. 523 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Kirchner]; 38 Am. Jun.
NEGLIGENCE § 65 (1941).
4. 188 Neb. at 454, 197 N.W.2d at 379. "The autopsy revealed that
Lienemann died as a result of a ruptured aorta probably caused by
broken ribs, and that he had a blood clot in the brain which had
been there before the accident occurred."
The cerebrovascular accident, often referred to by the
nonmedical term 'stroke,' is another group in this complex
of circulatory diseases. While one usually thinks of the
'stroke' as resulting in complete, sudden, and prolonged in-
capacity, or death, it should be remembered that there are
many variations in the symptomotology. Although some of
these may result in incapacity of a major nature which is
easily recognized, the more minor and transient may go
unrecognized, but they are capable of prodicing momen-
tary and complete incapacity in a driver of a motor vehi-
cle. Therefore in addition to the blood clots or hemorrhages
which affect the brain and result in the pronounced dis-
abilities, these transient attacks raise a major question in
the problem of negligence. These episodes are often re-
ferred to by the person who has suffered them as 'dizzy
spells' or 'blackouts.' They usually occur from a momen-
tary decrease in circulating blood to the brain in persons
with vascular disease. Though the symptoms may be short
in duration, the incapacity for driving a motor vehicle may
be total during this brief time. The recovery in this situa-
tion may be complete and leave no objective evidence of it
having occurred.
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road for three-tenths of a mile, careening into three fence posts
and jumping a drainage ditch before returning to the highway.
After traveling 3,800 feet 5 on the highway, Lienemann's vehicle
veered into the left lane of traffic and collided head-on with a ve-
hicle driven by the plaintiff's decedent, Moats. Lienemann as well
as Moats and his wife were killed, and representatives of Moats'
estate brought a wrongful death action against Lienemann's estate.
As an answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant denied
any negligence on the part of Lienemann by asserting the "unavoid-
able accident" doctrine as a defense. After hearing evidence from
both parties, the trial judge denied defendant's motions for a di-
rected verdict and a new trial. The jury was instructed on un-
avoidable accident. The jury returned a plaintiff's verdict for more
than 46,000 dollars in damages. By returning a verdict for the
plaintiff, the jury in effect found that the preponderance of the
evidence indicated that Lienemann was in control of his car at the
time of the collision.,
The purpose of this casenote is to examine the conflicting con-
siderations that concern the trial court when a defendant attempts
to employ the unavoidable accident defense. In numerous juris-
dictions, there is an increasing reluctance to use the unavoidable
accident instruction because of a belief that the instruction unnec-
essarily confuses the jury.7 In what appears to be the majority of
jurisdictions," however, trial courts permit use of the unavoidable
accident instruction. In these jurisdictions, it is believed the un-
avoidable accident instruction assists the jury in focusing deliber-
ations and inquiries on the specific factual questions at issue. The
use of the instruction in Moats indicates that, despite this trend of
abandoning the doctrine, the Nebraska Supreme Court favors utili-
zation of the unavoidable accident instruction when pleadings and
evidence properly raise and support the issue of unavoidable acci-
dent as a defense to a complaint premised on negligence.
Examination of the historical background of the unavoidable
accident doctrine helps to place these conflicting considerations in
a clearer perspective. Under English common law, when one per-
Kirchner, supra note 3, at 526.
5. 188 Neb. at 455, 197 N.W.2d at 380.
6. Id. at 454-55, 197 N.W.2d at 380. The defense of the defendant was
that Lienemann was suddenly stricken by illness, which he had no
reason to anticipate, while driving an automobile, which rendered it
impossible for him to control the car and is, therefore, not charge-
able with negligence. The defendant argued that the basis for the
jury verdict was the result of speculation and conjecture.
7. See Berry, The Unavoidable Accident Instruction, 17 DEFENSE L.J.
259 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Berry]; Annot. 65 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1959).
8. 65 A.L.R.2d 1, 24 (1959).
NEGLIGENCE
son was injured by another, without fault attributable to either
party, the injured person as a matter of right was entitled to com-
pensation from the tort feasor. The concept of fault was irrelevant
in realizing the policy of compensation.9 This policy of imposing
"absolute liability" gradually gave way to the modern principles
of negligence law predicated on the issue of fault.'0
The shift from "absolute liability" to principles of fault as the
basic policy underlying the compensation of an injured person's
loss was first recognized in this country in the landmark case of
Brown v. Kendall.." By denying the plaintiff compensation for the
injuries accidentally inflicted by the defendant, this decision causes
"the pendulum of the common law [to swing] from a viewpoint
which focused on the fact of injury to a view which focused on the
culpability of the actor who in fact was the cause of the loss.1112
The injured person's loss would not be shifted without proof that
the actor breached his duty of due care as defined by the "reason-
able man" standard of conduct. The controlling question in mod-
ern negligence law is whether the actor's blameworthy act is the
foreseeable legal or proximate cause of the alleged loss suffered
by the complaining party.
A plaintiff's loss resulting from an unforeseeable accident is not
compensable when a defendant cannot be held culpable. Because
an unforeseeable accident is unpreventable, a defendant is not con-
sidered blameworthy. Professor William Prosser defined an un-
avoidable accident as follows: "An unavoidable accident is an oc-
currence which was not intended, and which, under all the circum-
stances, could not have been foreseen or prevented by the exercise
of reasonable precautions."' 3 By definition, an unavoidable acci-
9. See Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARv. L. REv. 97 (1908).
10. Weaver v. Ward, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616); Stanley v. Powell,
[1891] 1 Q.B. 86. As an aside beyond the scope of this casenote, one
should note the current trend away from considerations of fault. In
certain areas of tort law, strict liability is imposed for reasons ir-
respective of fault, i.e., ability to pay. The current trend away from
considerations of fault is of course inherent in the concept of no-
fault insurance for automobile victims.
11. 60 Mass. 292, 6 Cush. 292 (1850).
12. Rees, Unavoidable Accident-A Misunderstood Concept, 5 AIZ. L.
REv. 224, 227 (1964).
13. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 29 at 140 (4th ed.
1971). See Uncapher v. Baltimore & O.R., 127 Ohio St. 351, 188
N.E. 553 (1933); Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75 (1864); Larrow v. Mar-
tel, 92 Vt. 435, 104 A. 826 (1918); "Unavoidable accident does not
apply only where the injury is brought about by the intervention of
outside forces, whether of God, nature. . . ." 65 C.J.S. Negligence
§ 21 at 649 (1966) (emphasis added); "An Act of God is a manifesta-
tion of nature so unusual and extraordinary that it could not under
normal conditions have been reasonably anticipated or expected."
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dent arises from circumstances in which a plaintiff suffers a loss,
but neither the plaintiff nor the defendant is at fault. Conse-
quently, courts have denied a plaintiff recovery against a defend-
ant when the accident was caused by the defendant having suf-
fered a heart attack, 1 4 a stroke,15 a fainting spell,16 an insulin reac-
tion,' 7 an epileptic seizure' 8 or having fallen asleep. 19
Snyder v. Farmers Irr. Dist., 157 Neb. 771, 61 N.W.2d 557 (1953).
See Cover v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irr. Dist., 162 Neb. 146.
75 N.W.2d 661 (1956); NEB. JURY INSTRUcTIoNS No. 3.11 (1969). In
response to the plaintiff's complaint of negligence,
the defendant may plead and offer proof of matters in ex-
cuse or justification, as that the injury complained of
would have occurred in any event without the concurrence
of the defendant's negligence, or that some outside, inde-
pendent force, of such nature that the defendant in its
duty of observing care could not reasonably have antici-
pated or guarded against, was the proximate cause of the
injury. Such defenses, while not technically confession and
avoidance, partake of the nature of such defense. While not
confessing the cause of action, they seek to avoid its effect
by proof of other and new matter which bars the plain-
tiff's right to recover, and they must be established by the
defendant in order to overcome the evidence on the part of
the plaintiff, which, unexplained, would establish the de-
fendant's negligence. They are affirmative in their nature
and the burden of proving them is upon the person assert-
ing them. * * * The burden was placed upon the plaintiff
by the instruction to prove the defendant's negligence
of duty and his damage. After he had made his case, in
order to escape the logical result of this proof, the defendant
was required to show that the loss was inevitable under the
circumstances.
157 Neb. at 779-80, 61 N.W.2d at 561. When a defendant alleges that
the accident or occurrence was the result of an "Act of God", he
assumes the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that the accident or occurrence was the sole proximate cause of the
accident or occurrence and the resulting injuries to the plaintiff.
NEB. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 2.02B (1969). It would be conceptually in-
consistent to instruct the jury on "Act of God" while also instructing
on contributory negligence.
14. Ford v. Carew & English, 89 Cal. App. 2d 199, 200 P.2d 828 (1948).
See Kraig, Heart Attack as a Defense in Negligence Actions, 12
CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 59 (1963); Kirchner, supra note 3.
15. Baker v. Hausman, 68 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1953); Keller v. Wonn, 140
W. Va. 860, 87 S.E.2d 453 (1955).
16. Armstrong v. Cook, 250 Mich. 180, 229 N.W. 443 (1930); Lehman v.
Haynam, 164 Ohio St. 595, 133 N.E.2d 97 (1956).
17. Porter v. Price, 11 Utah 2d 80, 355 P.2d 666 (1960).
18. Shirks Motor Express v. Oxenham, 204 Md. 626, 106 A.2d 46, cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 966 (1954); Wishone v. Yellow Cab Co., 20 Tenn.
App. 229, 97 S.W.2d 452 (1936).
19. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432 (1925). However in
Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d 91, 118 N.W.2d
140, rehearing denied, 18 Wis.2d 91, 119 N.W.2d 393 (1962), going to
sleep while driving was held to be negligence as a matter of law.
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As Moats illustrates, Nebraska courts have not abandoned the
unavoidable accident doctrine. The Supreme Court in Kelly v.
Gagnon20 defined an unavoidable accident as "any casualty which
could not be prevented by ordinary care and diligence."12 1  The
doctrine of unavoidable accident has been held to be a valid defense
barring a plaintiff's recovery when evidence and circumstances
surrounding the plaintiff's loss fail to disclose negligence on the
part of either party.22
In Moats, the plaintiff grounded his claim for damages in prin-
ciples of negligence law. 23 By alleging specific acts of negligence,
the plaintiff assumed the burden of proving24 by the preponder-
The court said no facts can exist which will justify, excuse or ex-
culpate falling asleep, except in cases of illness.
20. 121 Neb. 113, 236 N.W. 160 (1931) (defendant's car tire was punc-
tured by a spike lying on the highway which was held an unavoid-
able accident).
21. 121 Neb. at 121, 236 N.W. at 164. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Bonacci, 111 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1940) (accident caused by a
punctured tire); Bonacci v. Cerra, 134 Neb. 476, 279 N.W. 173 (1938).
In Wright v. Lincoln City Lines, Inc., 163 Neb. 679, 684, 81 N.W.2d
170, 175 (1957), unavoidable accident was defined as "when an unex-
pected catastrophe occurs without any of the parties thereto being to
blame for it."
22. Anderson v. Moser, 169 Neb. 134, 98 N.W.2d 703 (1959) (concept of
unavoidable accident applied to simple-tool doctrine); Cover v. Platte
Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 162 Neb. 146, 75 N.W.2d 661 (1956)
(flood); Hilzer v. Farmers Irr. Dist., 156 Neb. 398, 56 N.W.2d 457
(1953) (flood); Kuchau v. Chicago B. & Q.R., 150 Neb. 498, 34 N.W.2d
899 (1948) (flood defined as Act of God); Meyers v. Neeld, 137 Neb.
428, 289 N.W. 797 (1940) (where evidence and circumstances fail to
disclose either defendant motorist or plaintiff rider was at fault and
collision was unavoidable, no recovery could be had).
23. Brief for Appellant at 2.
24. NEB. JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 2.02(I) (B) (1969):
Before the plaintiff can recover against the defendant on
his petition in this action, the burden is upon the plaintiff
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence each and all of
the following propositions:
1. That the defendant was negligent in one or more of
the particulars claimed against him by the plaintiff in his
petition;
2. That such negligence, if any, of the defendant was
the proximate cause or a proximately-contributing cause of
the collision;
3. That as the direct and proximate result of said neg-
ligence and resultant collision, the plaintiff sustained dam-
ages; and
4. The nature, extent, and amount of the damages thus
sustained by the plaintiff.
NEB. JuRY INSTRUCTiONS No. 2.02 (11) (B) (1969):
In connection with the assertion of the plaintiff's negli-
gence, the burden is upon the defendant to prove by a pre-
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ance of the evidence that the defendant's decedent Lienemann op-
erated his vehicle in a manner that failed to meet the standard of
reasonable and ordinary care. The plaintiff was required to show
that Lienemann negligently operated his vehicle in a manner that
would foreseeably result in the direct and proximate cause of the
plaintiff's decedent's injuries.
It is important to note that the defense of unavoidable accident
is not an affirmative defense.25 By raising the defense of unavoid-
able accident, the defendant did not asume the burden of estab-
lishing Lienemann's incapacity to control the car. The burden
was still on the plaintiff to prove the collision was not unavoid-
able, Lienemann was able to control his car even though certain
disabilities may have existed and he negligently failed to control
his vehicle.
By asserting the unavoidable accident defense, a defendant at-
tempts to narrow and more clearly define the scope of issues raised
by his general denial of the plaintiff's complaint. The defendant
in effect contends that the plaintiff's loss was not legally caused
by the negligence of either party, and, therefore, the plaintiff
should be denied recovery.
The defendant asserted his defense of unavoidable accident on
the theory that his decedent Lienemann was incapable of meeting
the ordinary, reasonable standard of care because he had become
incapacitated by a massive cerebral hemorrhage. 2 Since the evi-
dence presented by both parties could have reasonably supported
conflicting findings on Lienemann's capability of controlling his
car, the trial court submitted an unavoidable accident instruction
to the jury.27
The court has held that an unavoidable accident instruction
is not justified unless the issue is raised in the pleadings and is
reasonably supported by evidence.28  To give an unavoidable acci-
dent instruction without supporting evidence having been presented
is reversible error.29 It is not error, however, to fail to instruct on
ponderance of the evidence each and all of the following
propositions:
1. That the plaintiff was negligent in one or more of
the particulars claimed against him by the defendant; and
2. That such negligence, if any, of the plaintiff was the
proximate cause or a proximately-contributing cause of the
plaintiff's (injuries, damages).
25. 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 21 at 651 (1966).
26. 188 Neb. at 454, 197 N.W.2d at 379-80.
27. See note 6 supra.
28. Owen v. Moore, 166 Neb. 226, 88 N.W.2d 759 (1958); Wright v. Lincoln
City Lines, Inc., 163 Neb. 679, 81 N.W.2d 170 (1957).
29. See note 28 supra.
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unavoidable accident where other instructions describe defendant's
rights.3 0
One reason for the decline of the unavoidable accident doctrine
in other jurisdictions is its tendency to needlessly confuse the jury
when used in conjunction with a contributory negligence defense.3 1
Unnecessary jury confusion is created when a defendant argues the
accident was unavoidable and could not have been prevented,
while claiming that although he may have been negligent, the
plaintiff was contributorily negligent. The defendant concludes he
should be absolved of all liability. This inherent conceptual in-
compatibility, arising when the unavoidable accident doctrine and
the affirmative defense of contributory negligence are combined
in a defense was recently examined in the Journal of the American
Trial Lawyers Association:32
Accepting the fundamental definition of unavoidable accident
as an occurrence where neither plaintiff nor defendant is to blame,
and that the accident would have happened anyway, even with
the exercise of ordinary care, then surely an instruction on con-
tributory negligence should be held inconsistent and confusing. It
therefore follows that in any case where there is evidence of con-
tributory negligence, an unavoidable accident instruction should
never be given. Obviously, defense counsel would like the advan-
tage of both, but if required to elect, will choose contributory
negligence....
This conceptual inconsistency between the affirmative defense
of contributory negligence and the defense of unavoidable accident
results in appellate reversal of defendant's verdicts. The signif-
icant possibility of jury confusion is considered reversible error
because the defendant's case was prejudicially favored when sub-
mitted to the jury.33  In order to prevent this sort of confusion,
numerous jurisdictions34 have abandoned the unavoidable accident
defense and jury instruction altogether. 35
30. Schmidt v. Johnson, 184 Neb. 643, 171 N.W.2d 64 (1969); Harding
v. Hoffman, 158 Neb. 86, 62 N.W.2d 333 (1954) (not reversible error to
either give or not give instructions on unavoidable accident); Peacock
v. J.L. Brandeis & Sons, 157 Neb. 514, 516, 60 N.W.2d 643 (1953).
31. See Berry, supra note 8, at 265; Ware v. Olstow, 112 Ga. App. 627,
145 S.E.2d 721 (1965); Guanzon v. Kalmou, 48 Hawaii 330, 402 P.2d
289 (1965); Gould v. Brown Const. Co., 75 N.M. 103, 401 P.2d 100
(1965); Grubb v. Wolfe, 75 N.M. 601, 408 P.2d 756 (1965); Shaw v.
Null, 397 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965); Iowa v. Sodolak, 398
S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Bolling v. Clay, 150 W. Va. 249,
144 S.E.2d 682 (1965).
32. Comment, 31 J. Am. TkIAL LAwYERs Ass'x. 81, 82 (1965).
33. Berry, supra note 8, at 264.
34. Annot. 65 A.L.R.2d 1, 27 (1959).
35. See, e.g., Butigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal. 2d 652, 320 P.2d 500
(1958), which expressly overruled Parker v. Womach, 37 Cal. 2d 116,
230 P.2d 823 (1951). The Butigan case clearly indicated that Cal-
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The Nebraska Supreme Court has attempted to overcome the
problem of prejudicial jury confusion without abandoning the un-
avoidable accident doctrine by consistently requiring that the un-
avoidable accident instruction be used only when the issue is
clearly supported by evidence. In these situations, the court has
found the instruction useful in assisting with jury deliberations
over factual issues. The instruction has the advantage of direct-
ing the jury's attention to those factual issues in dispute. The Su-
preme Court, however, has recognized that the instruction should
not be used when a defendant also relies on a contributory negli-
gence defense. For example in Stocker v. Roach,36 the court held
that it was reversible error to give the unavoidable accident in-
struction since the defendant had filed a cross-petition alleging
plaintiff's negligence. Moreover, in retaining the unavoidable ac-
cident doctrine as a defense against a complaint of negligence, the
court has properly limited the doctrine to those cases where its use
is supported by evidence and is consistent with all aspects of the
defense.
In conclusion, the Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in Moats
reaffirmed the court's approval of the limited role that the un-
avoidable accident doctrine plays in negligence litigation. Al-
though the court has limited the application of the doctrine in or-
der to avoid problems of unfair jury confusion, it has refrained
from joining those jurisdictions which have abandoned the doc-
trine completely. The court appears to have chosen the superior
viewpoint which recognized both the limitations and advantages of
the unavoidable accident doctrine. When appropriate as a specific
aspect of a defendant's general denial of negligence, continued use
of the unavoidable accident instruction allows the court to assist
the jury's inquiry into the pertinent factual questions at issue.
James S. Mitchell '74
ifornia courts would no longer use the unavoidable accident instruc-
tion since the instruction was adequately encompassed within the
general negligence instructions.
36. 140 Neb. 561, 300 N.W. 627 (1941).
